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I. The Cass-Okuno-Zilcha Conjecture 
In [l] we presented several examples of consumption-loan type 
models exhibiting the nonexistence of any competitive equilibrium which 
is Pareto optimal. One sort of example -- involving nonmonotonicity in 
tastes -- seemed very special (see [l, pp. 62-66]). Evidently, it 
depended on having just the right combination of some consumption 
satiation together with some boundary endowments. We conjectured that 
such speciality wasn't essential to the intuitive proposition being 
advanced, that somewhat less than total satiation might unfavorably 
restrict potential intertemporal market transfers -- even given the 
institution of money, in its role as a store of value, as a common 
means for facilitating trade between the present and the future. 
Rather, we proposed as a more likely reason for such speciality the 
particular analytic methodology being utilized, the limitation to 
considering only models for which competitive equilibria could be 
essentially characterized as the nonnegative solutions to a first order 
difference equation (and thus completely represented in terms of a 
two-dimensional diagram). 
It turns out that while our intuition was correct, our 
reasoning wasn't. In fact, it is now apparent that the only operative 
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constraint was simply our lack of sufficient ingenuity. 
In the next section I sketch a robust nonoptima]it 
��i•tenoe nf Pareto optimal equilil>ri� per•i•ta in l thj p 
small perturbations in both tastes and endowments. The pJcu 
of the satiation phenomena introduced in this example lntJil 
examt1lle; 
esen�elof 
_ I I interesting anomalies as well. Two of these additional resu 
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briefly discussed in the final section. 
II. A Robust Nonoptimality Example 
Consider the basic model described in [l, pp! 44-4 ] ,  
suppose once again that there are two consumers in evety Jen ratJ 
the oldest, G0 = {O} and Gt = { 2t-l, 2t} for t G; 1, and thJt dd-J I II consumers, h = 2t-l for t G; 1, are of a-type, even-numbered, h = 
for t G; 1, of S-type. Their respective tastes and endbwmJnt
assumed to be as specified in Figure la. The critical l geJer 
are: 
1 fj 
[insert Fig. l] 
of this specification are that (i) both a- and S-type consum[rs c 
become satiated in second period consumption -- thoughlat le st o[� 
type can never become satiated in first period consump ion - wh� 
(ii) the a- but not the S-type consumer is relatively lvejbu denj 
second period income. By exploiting the more specific l feJtutes 
introduced in order to simplify exposition -- especially, thr pal 
linear structure of both type consumers' offer curves lt all exc�J 
�ry 1� real rate• of return -- Figure lb make• plain tbjt, ...,.J 
are a plethora of both barter and monetary equilibria in Jhis ex 
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Figur e I . Nonoptimality due to nonmonotonicity: on example with potential 
satiation in second period consumption 
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nevertheless every competitive equilibrium must exhibit reallrates 
return which satisfy the uniform bound 
for h 
auh (ch)/ auh(ch) 
h h act act+l 
P/Pt+l 
2t-l, 2t and t � 1. 
zt+l/zt � (1-E)/(l�E) < 
Hence, it is easily seen (referring to the ericircl d pon 
of Figure la, and appealing to the specific characteridticb f thjI I IIgeometric construction briefly remarked in the following par graph 
that every o=petitivo allnoation fa d=i=tod by a cn,m�n ding l 
feasible allocation which is identical but for a sequence bf suff i 
small one-for-one forward transfers between only a-typJ coL;;umers 
O < A 2t-l _ A 2t-l _ A a < 7{1- f J l - ct - ct+l - c or t = 
(or, alternatively, only $-type consumers 
2t 2t s -;-$ 0 < - Act = Act+l = Ac < A for t � 1),. 
That this example is legitimate, and, more imporra 
its welfare significance is invariant to sufficiently �all 
in both tastes and endowments should become self-evideJt fko 
examination of Figure 2. This figure contains directidns �o 
[insert Fig. 2] 
er tu� 
clos 
constructing a well-behaved utility function consistent with1my 
specification of the a-type consumer; a similar procedjre harl be
employed to justify my specification of the $-type conjumel.j Sino 
both on�t,�ta a'e ve'y oln•ely patte�ed afte' that �'etd �j
at great length in [l, pp. 71-78], I omit further elabo�atio here 
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Figure 2. Construction of an offer curve eKhibiting "perverse" 
behovior at extreme r elative prices 
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III. Additional Difficulties Associated with Satiation1Phenci$ena 
A. Nonexistence of Competitive Equilibrium I I 
6 
Figure 3 displays a technically minor modification ©f the 
preceding example which entails a substantively major cJnc1ls1on: 
merely ahifeing porciono of boili •=aumera' iudiffmooj 1p•l-- s�llll hat 
the a-type (resp. , B-type) consumer's offer curve is consider bly mess I I (resp. , more) steeply sloped at negative real rates of returnlnear 
zero -- competitive equilibrium ceases to exist. 
[insert Fig. 3] 
On first blush this result is somewhat surprising! l\11 
consumers' tastes and endowments continue to enjoy the kaml r gula�· y 
propertiea ao before. Upon oloaer i�peotinn, •��er,lthj ' uroj I 
the difficulty is easily discovered. The peculiar secohd-Jer od j �ure 
of satiation has now combined with the intrinsic one-dikecJio al jj re 
of time in just such a manner that there is simply not lnojgh strj� _ 
interrelationship between generations to admit trade -- ev�n radJl l�ply 
amnng membera of eaoh generation -- through tbe m.rket metJan · �.  
Deficiency of this sort is well-know to create difficulhieJ f r ex�l · ��ence 
of oompetitive equilibri� in the otandard Arr�-Debreu �1el (oe�I �"' 
particular, the illuminating seminal analysis of McKenzie U3] 
• 
version of the example suggests that -- in the intertemborJ1 onte[[ 
ral 
these difficulties should not be peremptorily dismissed as rl ere 
curiosities. It also hints at a commonality between the cilrcr:ta. 
giving rise for nonoptimality and those giving rise to lonjxi tenJ 
which should be thoroughly investigated. 
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Figure 3. Version of the example where there is no competitive equilibrium 
( b arter or monetary l 
B. Ineffectiveness of Social Security 
Subject to well-known standard 
basic theorem of welfare economics -- that 
allocation is a competitive equilibrium 
distribution of endowments ) -- obtains 
(see, in particular, the even more comprehensive analvsis 
Majumdar-Mitra [2] ). In the present example (in 
or modified form), for instance, any redistribution 
according to the scheme 
hoy 
0 4£ y - 3(3+£) for h = o 
a* c + (o,-o) for h 
cS* + (-o,o) otherwise 
permits attaining a barter equilibrium which is Pareto 
(supported by prices pt = 1 for t � 1 and yielding the 
h c 
0 4£ y 
- 3(3+£) 
a* c 
S* c 
for h 0 
for h 
otherwise. ) 
The central message of this example, of course, is 
t 
t 
advent of money as a store of value may not be an auc�ua� 
such a redistribution of endowments. Thus, there 
partly unanswered an extremely interesting question: 
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simplest extra-market institutional arrangements -- perhaps involving 
some direct redistribution of endowments -- which will permit attaining 
Pareto optimality in a wide class of intertemporal market environments? 
I hazard the opinion -- based primarily on extensive analysis 
of consumption-loan type models embodying both variety of commodities 
and diversity of consumers -- that a minimal qualification for any such 
arrangement will be a large degree of flexibility in confronting 
heterogeneity across agents. 
This view is suggestively supported (but by no means precisely 
or conclusively demonstrated), for instance, by considering the scope 
of a perpetual per capita transfer T from young to old -- or a simple 
social security system in.the present example. It is a fairly 
straightforward matter to establish that whether or not such uniform 
social transfers are potent enough to permit attaining Pareto optimality 
through additional market transfers is problematical, and ultimately 
depends on whether or not they conceivably admit barter equilibrium at 
some nonnegative real rate of return. Figure 4 presents a polar version 
of the example where a simple social security system is necessarily 
ineffective. The figure is more or less self-explanatory, once it is 
[insert Fig. 4] 
noted that any shift from first to second period income essentially 
results in some distorted rotation of the reflected generational offer 
curve (still defined relative to original endowments) around its 
intersection with the 45° line in the negative quadrant. 
Clearly, this counterexample depends on the particular 
structure of the distortion displayed in Figure 4b, which in turn 
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Fil�ure 4. Version of the example where a simple 
will not permit attaining Pareto optimality 
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depends on the particular character of the behavior displayed in 
Figure 4a -- especially the relative·sensitivity (resp. , absolute 
insensitivity) of the a-type (resp. , a-type) consumer to shifts from 
first to second period income. The opposite polar version of the 
present example -- reversing these sensitivities -- yields a model in 
which a simple social security system is potentially effective. 
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